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This thesis was designed to determine how domain knowledge or scene content
affects change detection. Twenty-four participants of medical professionals and nonmedical professionals performed a change detection task using a flicker paradigm
intended to be similar to saccadic movements or blinks. Each participant viewed 24
pictures on a computer screen, each picture flickering with a blank gray screen alternating
between the original and modified version of the picture, and was asked to indicate when
a change was detected by depressing a key. Twelve of the pictures were medical X-rays
while the other 12 were everyday scenes. Reaction time, number of trials exceeding the
60 seconds allowed for the task, and response accuracy were measured. Results indicated
that domain knowledge did not have a significant effect on the speed, number of trials
exceeding time limit, or accuracy of the change detection task. However, results
indicated that scene content did have a significant effect on reaction time, as all
participants detected change quicker in the X-rays than in the everyday scenes. Scene
content did not have an effect on response accuracy.
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Introduction

Medical error has become a huge issue for patients, doctors, insurance
companies, and for the nation. In a recent State of the Union Address, President George
W. Bush outlined three economic reforms that deserve to be priorities for the Congress.
One of these reforms is to reduce medical errors and their related costs (Bush, 2007). In
an era of rapid employee turnover, fast-paced medical systems, increased employee
overtime, and a push to improve the bottom line in health care, the concern for patient
safety is becoming ever more paramount ((Battalora, 2007). The 1999 Institute of
Medicine (IOM) report To Err is Human highlighted that as many as 98,000 deaths in the
United States each year result from medical errors (Clinton, 2006).
According to Reason (1990), errors can be classified either as mistakes or as slips.
Mistakes are errors in choosing an objective or in specifying a means of achieving it;
often referred to as a "judgment error," and slips are errors in carrying out an intended
means for reaching an objective (Sternberg, 2003). Although many medical errors are a
result of professional judgment, there are also many costly errors that are slips where
something has gone unnoticed.
Human beings have never been able to eliminate human error, and most likely
never will. Consider the following example.
In a university health clinic at a flight school, every incoming or potential
student must submit a medical report form which includes an extensive medical history.
Any medical problems or abnormalities that may not be compatible with flight according
to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must be detected. These require some
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judgment by report reviewers at times as different injuries or conditions in a medical
history can be rather "gray" areas and must be assessed on an individual basis.
A few weeks into one semester, there was a flight incident. A flight instructor
reported that while in the air with a new flight student, the flight student became
disoriented and confused and did not respond verbally at intervals. The flight instructor
immediately took over the flight and landed the aircraft. Thanks to the flight instructor's
astuteness and quick response to intervene a potentially tragic outcome was avoided. No
one was hurt, and no damage was incurred to the aircraft.
It was discovered after the flight that this student has had Type I Diabetes
Mellitus and had been insulin dependent since early childhood. The incident occurred
due to a hypoglycemic reaction, which means the blood sugar simply dropped too low.
An error occurred even though there are regulations in place to avoid such an
error. In order for any student or pilot to fly an aircraft anywhere in the United States he
or she must have been issued a flight medical certificate by the FAA. A flight medical
exam must be performed by a physician who is an FAA certified Aviation Medical
Examiner (AME) and any conditions or illnesses must be reported. Many medical
conditions are considered as "disqualifying" by the FAA, one of which is Diabetes
Mellitus. Despite this policy, the diabetic passed through two quality checkpoints and
was approved by healthcare personnel to fly an aircraft. Human error must have
occurred. The first error was a judgment error on the part of the AME who issued the
student a second class medical certificate. The second error was a slip. The practitioner
who had read and approved the medical report form for flight had failed to notice the
medical history of Type I Diabetes Mellitus written plainly on the page. It is hard to
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surmise exactly why this practitioner missed the information. This is particularly true
once several weeks have passed after the document had been reviewed. Any specifics
surrounding the situation such as distraction, fatigue, or sleep deprivation on the part of
the practitioner would have been forgotten.
These types of slips committed by humans extend into many aspects of our lives.
The world of medicine is probably one of the most important areas where a slip can prove
most costly, as we very highly value the human life. No one wants to lose a loved one
due to a slip committed by a health care professional. Yet, these professionals are only
human themselves, and occasional human error remains a fact of life.

Review of the Literature
Change Detection
Change detection is the act of realizing a change in the world around us. The
detection of change is important in our everyday lives—for example, noticing a person
entering a room, watching for the traffic light to change at the intersection, or seeing a car
suddenly pull out in front of you. (Rensink, 2002).
In the world of medicine, often times people's lives depend on a health care
professional being able to detect a change in a person's symptoms, on an X-ray or various
other films or images. Failure to detect even the very small or subtle change can mean a
world of difference. Human errors have proven to be one of the most formidable patient
care challenges in acute health care settings. The pressure to reduce medical errors has
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remained at the top of the agenda in patient care improvement, and the root causes of
medical errors continue to be actively sought (Chow et al., 2005).
Although research has consistently revealed the visual system's impressive ability
to analyze scenes, segregate figures from backgrounds, and quickly categorize objects,
findings of the inability to correctly detect change suggest strict limits on the amount of
information that can be consciously retained and compared from view to view, even over
short delays. These data support the conclusion that successful change detection requires
attention to be focused on the changing object (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997).
However, even if attending to an object may be necessary for change detection, it is not
sufficient as even changes to an attended object can go undetected (Levin et al., 2002).

Change Blindness
The ability to detect changes in an ever-changing environment is highly
advantageous to all of us, as this ability may prove to be critical for survival. In the real
world, changes are often accompanied by transients or fleeting warnings of some sort,
e.g., motion signals that attract attention to their location or sudden or isolated
illumination (Remington, Johnston, & Yantis,1992). If a commonly used railroad
crossing that does not see much train traffic suddenly has lights flashing and gates going
down, your realization of this change would serve to preserve your life, causing you to
immediately stop at a crossing where you usually proceed across. When an item is seen
to change, attention is drawn to the location of that item to facilitate visual processing.
However, changes may occur in the absence of accompanying transients, such as those
occurring during saccades, blinks, or flicker (Pessoa & Ungerleider, 2004).
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When we read printed material or scan a scene, our eyes do not move smoothly
along a page. Rather, our eyes move in saccades—a succession of rapid sequential
movements as they fixate on successive clumps of text. Pollatsek & Rayner (1989) have
described these fixations as a series of "snapshots." Saccadic movements leap an average
of about 7-9 characters between successive fixations (Sternberg, 2003). If a visible
change occurs during saccades, or flickers, it often goes undetected (Pessoa &
Ungerleider, 2004).
Many studies (e.g.Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons,
1996) have found that observers often fail to report the presence of large changes in a
display when these changes occur simultaneously with a transient such as an eye
movement or flash of the display. This has been interpreted as change blindness (CB), a
failure to see unattended changes. Other studies (e.g. Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Mack &
Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) have found that observers attending to a particular
object or event often fail to report the presence of unexpected items. This has been
interpreted as inattentional blindness (IB), a failure to see unexpected items (Rensink,
2000). Change blindness and inattentional blindness, closely related, suggest that
humans have a limited capacity for attention which thus limits the amount of information
processed at any particular time. Any otherwise salient feature within the visual field
will not be observed if not processed by attention. The most well-known study
demonstrating IB was conducted by Simons and Chabris (1999). Subjects were asked to
watch a short video in which two groups of people wearing black and white t-shirts pass a
basketball back and forth among themselves. The subjects are told to either count the
number of passes made by one of the teams, or to keep count of bounce passes vs. aerial
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passes. During the video, a woman walks through the scene carrying an umbrella, or
wearing a full gorilla suit. In one version, the woman even stops in the middle and
pounds her chest before walking out of the scene. In most groups, 50% of the subjects
did not report seeing the gorilla. Simons interprets this by stating that we are mistaken
with regard to how important events will automatically draw our attention away from
current tasks or goals. This result indicates that the relationship between what is in our
visual field and perception is based much more significantly on attention that was
previously thought (Simons & Chabris, 1999).
A wide variety of studies demonstrating the inability to detect changes in visual
scenes emphasize the contrast between the richness of perception and the sparseness of
representation (Blackmore, Brelstaff, Nelson, & Troscianko 1995). Although research
has consistently revealed the visual system's impressive ability to analyze scenes,
segregate figures from backgrounds, and quickly categorize objects, findings of CB
suggest strict limits on the amount of information that can be consciously retained and
compared from view to view. Attending to an object may be necessary for change
detection, but even changes to an attended object go undetected. In a study conducted by
Simons & Levin (1998), a first experimenter approached participants on a university
campus and asked for directions to a nearby building. While they were conversing, two
other experimenters carrying a wooden door stopped between the participants and the
first experimenter, momentarily obscuring the participants' view of all three
experimenters. During the interruption, one of the experimenters carrying the door
stayed behind to continue the conversation as the first grabbed the door and walked away
behind it. Surprisingly, approximately 50% of participants failed to detect this change

and continued the conversation as if nothing had happened. The change escaped notice,
showing that attending to an object does not guarantee change detection, even if the
change is dramatic (Levin et al., 2002).
Many studies on the interplay between visual perception and memory have been
followed by a more recent surge of interest in CB. In a laboratory study performed by
Grimes (1996), 50% of observers actually failed to notice during eye movements when
two cowboys sitting on a bench exchanged heads! These shocking results inspired a
newer paradigm called the "flicker" task where an original and modified scene alternate
repeatedly, separating a brief blank displace, until the observer finds the change (Simons
& Rensink, 2005).
The results of these studies suggest that attention is needed for change perception,
with change blindness resulting whenever the accompanying visual signals failed to draw
attention. As stated earlier, the presence of a saccadic eye movement, a flicker or a blink
could actually cause failure to detect a change. The effects are even stronger when the
changes are unexpected. For example, if an actor in a scene is changed during a shift in
camera position, many observers do not notice, even if the actor has been replaced by
another person. Change blindness results whenever the accompanying motion signals fail
to draw attention. Attention is needed to see the change (Simons & Rensink, 2005).
While attention is needed to see the change, some aspect of visual perception
must occur as well for the observer to perceive the change, which requires certain events
to happen in the visual system. The retina is a thin layer of tissue that lines the back inner
wall of our eyeballs. The retina consists of millions of light-sensitive cells and nerve
cells that capture the images focused onto them by the cornea and lens. When light hits
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these cells, electrical impulses are generated and carried to the optic nerve. The optic
nerve then carries information gathered by the retina to the brain via a bundle of more
than one million nerve fibers (Mayo Clinic Staff, 2007). When looking at a scene, the
corresponding image formed at the retinal level can be conceived as a bi-dimentional
array of uncorrelated luminance points activating different receptors. In other words, at
this point, after the light has hit the cells in the retina, they are still points of light that
have no real meaning yet. In spite of that, we perceive meaningful objects where each
object is effortlessly seen as separate from others. According to Driver, Davis, Russell,
Turrato, & Freeman (2001), this perception is thought to arise from an image
segmentation process, which groups together those retinal inputs that are likely to be part
of the same object in the real world. It has been hypothesized that image segmentation
precedes and influences the deployment of attention in the visual scene. Segmentation
processes are influential factors, providing candidate objects for further attentional
selection, and the relevant literature has concentrated on how figure-ground segmentation
mechanisms influence visual attention (Mazza, Turatto, & Umilta, 2005).
In a recent study using a change blindness paradigm (Mazza et al., 2005), the
experimenters explored whether attention is preferentially allocated to the foreground
elements or to the background elements. The results indicated that unless attention was
voluntarily deployed to the background, large changes in the color of its elements
remained unnoticed. In contrast, minor changes in the foreground elements were
promptly reported. Differences in change blindness between the two regions of the
display indicated that attention is, by default, biased toward the foreground elements.
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This demonstrated the greater salience of the foreground elements than the background
elements (Mazza et al., 2005.)
In considering more physiological aspects, we make saccades about three times
each second, lasting 30 milliseconds (ms) in duration. The still periods between saccades,
called fixations, last about 300 ms in duration. Our saccades direct the fovea of the eye,
which provides us vision of objects of interest in our environment. Saccadic eye
movements can create problems in our perceptions as visual information sweeps across
the back of the eye. Consequently, objects we observe have different positions on the
retina from one fixation to the next (Irwin, 1996). It is well accepted that activity in the
occipitotemporal cortex of the brain plays a role in visual awareness. In a study
conducted by Beck, Rees, Frith, & Lavie (2001), functional magnetic resonance imaging
(/MRI) was used along with the change blindness phenomenon using a flicker paradigm,
to probe the neural correlates of visual awareness. Results revealed enhanced activity in
the ventral visual cortex, as predicted by many neural theories of visual awareness
(Logothetis, 1998), but also showed enhanced activity in the bilateral parietal cortex.
These results suggest that the right parietal cortex plays a critical role in conscious
change detection. Considering yMRI can only reveal an association between activity in a
brain region and behavior, it was unclear whether the parietal regions implicated in the
experiment play any causal role in awareness. However, in a more recent study
conducted by Beck, Muggleton, Walsh, & Lavic (2006), the results indicated that the
right posterior parietal cortex does play a causal role in the conscious detection of change
in a change blindness paradigm. These data suggest that the posterior parietal cortex
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activity may be involved in determining what does and does not enter the visual shortterm memory (Beck et al., 2006).
Just as the previous example raised a question of change awareness in foreground
versus background changes, a similar issue was raised by Wolfe (1999) concerning the
perceptual status of the unattended items in an induced-blindness experiment: does the
failure to report the unattended items correspond to blindness (i.e., a failure to perceive
the unattended items) or to amnesia (i.e., a failure to remember them)? In a study
conducted by Moore and Egeth (1997), it was shown that unattended items are indeed
perceived, at least as far as having an effect on reported items. But what about blindness
in terms of visual experience: one wonders whether we still have a fleeting, but
nevertheless conscious visual experience of unreported items and events. In measuring
change detection, the observer is often asked to respond to the change as soon as
possible—i.e., a direct on-line report. In this situation, the observer is set to respond as
soon as he/she notices any kind of change. As such, the report is made at the instant of
the event; assuming that the observer has the necessary visuo-motor coordination.
Failure of this report indicates a failure to respond to the event. Since all that is needed
to trigger the response is a minimal conscious experience, an inability to report the
change must indicate an inability to consciously experience it. As such, CB is not really
"change amnesia" (i.e., a failure to remember a perceived change), but is a true
blindness—a true failure to have a conscious visual experience of the change (Rensink,
2000).
Although these reports and failure to report are impressive, they are not sufficient
to establish that the observers had no visual experience of the unexpected stimuli. Even
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though the observers in the Simons & Chabris study likely did not see the unexpected
object as a gorilla, they still could have experienced the stimulus itself as an array of
colors and lines. More generally, the observers may have failed to assign the proper
category to the input, and so found nothing unusual about the stimulus. Another
possibility is that they may have perceived the stimulus correctly but were somehow
unable to make the appropriate response (Rensink, 2000.)
Failures in change detection have sparked lively debates about the nature of
visual representation and memory. Does CB indicate that our visual representation of the
world is exceedingly impoverished, as some theorists have suggested (e.g. Rensink, 2000,
2002; Simons & Levin, 1997)? Or might CB occur even though our visual
representations are relatively rich and detailed, as others have suggested (e.g. Henderson
& Hollingworth, 2003, Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Hollingworth, Williams, &
Henderson, 2001)? Although these two explanations might seem contradictory,
combining the impoverished and rich representation views suggests it is possible to have
situations yielding poor change detection performance, but good long-term visual
recognition performance (Varakin & Levin, 2006).
A study was carried out by Haines (1991) where they examined how experienced
pilots used a heads-up display on an aircraft simulator. Just before the simulated landing,
a large airplane was placed onto the runway at the point of touchdown. Even though it
was a highly relevant object, and should have triggered an immediate avoidance
response, the pilots often failed to detect this airplane (Rensink, 2000). This leads one to
ask whether the pilots had no visual experience of the stimulus, or they perceived the
stimulus correctly but were unable to make the appropriate response. It is difficult to
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determine whether the failure to report the unexpected items in IB experiments is due to
blindness or amnesia (Rensink, 2000).
Both CB and IB involve an inability to report visual stimuli that are obvious once
attended. Inattentional blindness pertains primarily to first-order aspects of visual input.
First order aspects pertain to seeing the presence of a stimulus at any moment in time.
This presence of quantities in the input is termed first-order information. Change
blindness pertains entirely to second-order aspects, which pertain to changes or
transitions which may occur at any time, and are not necessarily present at any moment in
time. Thus, CB concerns itself with second-order information, or the transitions
themselves between the quantities in the input. Change blindness may result from a
failure of visual short-term memory or comparison processes that are not really relevant
to IB (Rensink, 2000).
The IB and CB phenomena differ in their sensitivity to expectation effects,
implying the involvement of different kinds of attention: IB requires the absence of
divided attention, in which we manage to engage in more than one task at a time, and we
shift our attentional resources to allocate them prudently, as needed. Whereas CB
requires the absence of focused attention, in which we choose to attend to some stimuli,
and ignore others (Sternberg, 2003). Considering these differences, we can make some
conclusions about attention and visual experience. Since IB does not occur when one is
expecting the target, it is difficult to determine whether the absence of a direct on-line
report indicates the absence of a visual experience. Because CB is not greatly affected by
expectation, direct on-line reports can reliably indicate when the observer does or does

13
not have a visual experience of change—that is, a true failure to visually experience the
change (Rensink, 2000).
There are limits to some of the conclusions that can be drawn from the CB
literature, but considerable potential for more in-depth study is there. Change blindness
has contributed to our understanding of various mechanisms of visual perception,
including those that are central to our conscious experience of vision. Empirical studies
beyond the traditional boundaries of cognition and perception research have been
conducted, providing new ways to explore individual differences, expertise, and even
cultural differences. Change blindness may even provide new ways of studying aspects
of individual experience that have traditionally been difficult to investigate (Simons &
Rensink, 2005).
Change blindness research has resulted in a resurgence of the study of scene
perception, and the dynamics that underlie it. Both change detection and change
perception can be considered special cases of event perception, becoming useful tools for
understanding the perception of dynamic events more generally. This research inherently
concerns scene perception over time, something that most models of object recognition
do not. There is a potential to extend the concepts and techniques developed in this field
of research, which would thereby enable us to explore a world of interesting new
phenomena (Simons & Rensink, 2005).

Domain Knowledge and Scene Content
The search process may also be affected by one's familiarity with the area or
relative comfort with the scene content. Domain knowledge or expertise refers to a
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searcher's knowledge of the subject area (i.e., domain) that is the focus or topic of the
search. This knowledge may affect the searcher's process of search strategy formulation
and reformulation, retrieval success and the outcomes of the search (Wildemuth, 2004).
The conceptual knowledge a user brings to the search experience will affect
decisions they make, such as which terms they will use in conducting the search. In most
areas of cognitive psychology, subsequent learning is largely dependent on existing
knowledge or experience in that arena. Research has been conducted on the effects of
expertise on search behavior (Wildemuth, 2004), how feedback can impact the search
process (Pirolli & Card, 1999), and the existing literature on performance outcomes
related to search behavior (Jansen, Spink, Bateman, & Saracevic, 1998). Feedback is a
fundamental component of any search process. The relative success or failure of a search
attempt is evaluated by both the number of resources retrieved (hits) and how relevant
those resources are to the goals of the task at hand. Existing literature reports significant
differences between experts and novices in their search behavior and the outcomes it
produces (Allen, 1991; Hoelscher & Strube, 1999; Hsich-Ye, 1993; Jansen et al 1998;
Lazonder, 2000; Marchionini, 1995; Vakkari, Pennaned, & Serola, 2003). Present
research similarly hypothesizes differences between domain experts and novices. It is
hypothesized that novices would be more likely to reuse topic terms and be more
repetitious in search queries because novices do not possess the degree of related
knowledge and level of knowledge sophistication (Hembrooke, Granka, & Gay, 2005).
In recognizing and reporting change, there is a decision making process
occurring. According to Heeger (2003), there are two main components to the decisionmaking process: information acquisition (the collection of information), and criterion (the
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internal standard by which the information is decided). He uses a medical scenario to
illustrate this concept. Imagine that a radiologist is examining a CT scan, looking for
evidence of a tumor. Interpreting CT images is difficult and requires much training.
There is always some degree of uncertainty as to whether it is there or not. Information
acquisition occurs when there is information in the CT scan, such as the shape of the
lungs, image characteristics such as brightness or darkness, different texture. With
proper training a doctor learns what kinds of things to look for, so with more
practice/training they will be able to acquire more information. Perhaps running another
test, such as an MRI, can be useful in acquiring even more information. Criterion, the
second component of the decision-making process, occurs when you are permitted to use
your own judgment in addition to relying on technology/testing to provide information.
For example, some doctors may feel that missing an opportunity for early diagnosis may
mean the difference between life and death. A false alarm, on the other hand, may result
only in a routine biopsy operation. Two doctors with equally good training, looking at
the same CT scan, maybe have a different bias/criterion (Heeger, 2003).
In a study conducted by Hembrooke, Granka, and Gay (2005), the variables of
interest were chosen to simulate several of the most basic conditions that users typically
confront when seeking information, with a particular emphasis on domain expertise and
feedback. The search would begin when the subject was presented with an information
seeking task on a topic. The level of expertise the user has on that topic would be more
or less variable. The user would attempt to find resources, and would have more or less
experience and familiarity with that system. Feedback was presented, which would
reflect the relative success or failure of the attempted query. The searcher evaluates the
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resources returned and decides whether or not to terminate the search. Relative success
or failure in finding the relevant resources to satisfy the information need at hand can be
the result of the searcher s knowledge base and /or the decision-making at any point in
the cycle. This iterative search process is illustrated by Hembrooke, Granka, and Gay,
2005):
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Figure 1. The iterative search process.

As shown in Figure 1, relative success or failure in satisfying the information
need can be the result of the searcher's knowledge base and /or decision-making at any
point in this cycle. Results of this study indicated differences in the overall strategies
employed by novices and experts. Novices engaged in less effective strategic search
behavior while experts used elaboration (global level of detail and sophistication intrinsic
to user search attempts) more than novices, their overall searches being rated as more
complex. (Hembrooke et al., 2005).

17
In addition to an individual's expertise, scene content and familiarity can
influence a participant's ability to notice a change, or notice it more quickly. Rensink et
al. (1977), clearly demonstrated that observers' background knowledge of depicted
events directed attention to those objects in the scene that were most relevant. Using the
flicker paradigm, participants were presented with a flickering of two pictures of a scene
that included a change. The presentation of a visual mask (blank screen) was interleaved
between the flickering pictures to eliminate a motion signal. By interviewing the
participants, areas of central interest were identified. Scene content was then included to
cover or include those areas of central interest. Rensink et al. discovered that the
centrality of the change to the depicted event affected observers' detection of change, so
that changes in central areas were more readily noticed than were changes in marginal
areas of interest. Another study also using the flicker paradigm conducted by Jones,
Jones, Smith, & Copley (2003) demonstrated that drug users exhibited an attentional bias
for drug-related objects, so that heavier users detected changes in drug-related objects
more quickly and in neutral objects more slowly than did lighter users and non-users.
This provided evidence that attentional biases influence change detection when multiple
objects undergo simultaneous change (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2005).
A similar study was performed by Yaxley & Zwaan (2005) using groups of
smokers vs. non-smokers, and scene content involved smoking paraphernalia vs. neutral
objects. The results suggested that attentional bias affected detection latencies. In the
smokers group, change detection latencies were shortest when a smoking-related object
changed and longest when a smoking -related object was present, but did not undergo
change. The nonsmokers showed no bias toward smoking-related items. The findings
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suggest that types of attentional bias influence change detection. More empirical
evidence is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn about the relative effects of
context-independent and context-dependent attentional bias. The results demonstrate that
both types of bias affect the ability to detect change in the environment. It appears that
the flicker paradigm is a suitable tool for investigation a variety of attentional biases, in
that it is sensitive in detecting the influence of these biases on change detection (Yaxley
& Zwaan, 2005).
As illustrated in the literature, the ability to detect change, or detect the
unexpected plays an important role in preventing human error. In any profession, the risk
of human error is always present. Whether it be a minor risk or a major risk, such as
those sometimes put forth in the fields of aeronautics or medicine, we have never been
able to eliminate that risk. Errors sometimes occur due to simply missing something—
like a minor change in a display gauge or perhaps an X-ray or test result. Experiments
such as this help us to understand what factors might be involved in the detection of
change, as minor as they may seem. In trying to find a solution to a problem, or a cure to
an illness or disease, one must first determine the causal factors. Perhaps through
studying results of experiments in change detection, we can further reduce the incidence
of human error.

Statement of Hypotheses

It is expected that participants in the medical professionals group will detect
change quicker than those in the non-medical professionals group, based on previous
findings related to participants' levels of expertise in the relevant field. It is also
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expected that all participants viewing pictures will detect change quicker and more
accurately than those viewing X-rays, as everyday scenes are more familiar to
everyone than specialized images such as X-rays. Finally, it is expected that
participants in the medical professionals group viewing X-rays will exhibit the
quickest change detection overall. This is consistent with previous findings stated
earlier in the review of the literature that the search process is affected by one's
familiarity with the area or relative comfort with the scene content, as there are
significant differences between experts and novices in their search behavior.

Method
Participants
Participants were divided into 2 equal groups of 12. One group was comprised of
medical professionals. The medical professional group consisted of physicians who are
general practitioners, physician assistants, or nurse practitioners, all of whom have
received educational instruction in the general reading of X-rays. The medical
professionals are currently licensed and practicing, and between the ages of 18 and 65
years old. They were obtained by asking for willing participants at medical facilities
such as hospitals, medical offices, urgent care centers, and university health clinics in the
State of Florida. No physician with a medical or radiological specialty was included.
This eliminated any specialized or focused training on one certain area of the body or
body functions that will provide specialized exposure to X-rays. The non-medical group
consisted of participants employed in another profession, excluding those in relation to

medicine or radiology. They were between the ages of 18 and 65 years old.

Apparatus
The present study utilized a laptop computer equipped with custom-built
software. The program accurately timed the immediate response given by the
participants when they pressed the left mouse button. The laptop monitor remained on a
table 27 inches from the floor, and no greater than 24 inches from the participant's eyes
throughout the presentation. The participants were asked to view 24 pictures, one at a
time, and to immediately respond to any changes they see in the pictures while the image
is flickering. Half the pictures were of everyday objects while the other half were
pictures of medical X-rays. They were all black and white pictures presented in random
order, and all had a central focus. The following is an example of pictures used:

2A

2B

Figure 2. Two views of a sample image from the study. Figure 2A
shows the original image. Figure 2B shows the altered image.
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The following is another example of pictures of an X-ray used:

3A

3B

Figure 3. Two views for a second image from the study. Figure 3A shows the original
image. Figure 3B shows the altered image.

Design
This study is a 2x2 mixed fully factorial design. There are two independent
variables. The first independent variable is domain knowledge, or the level of acquired
knowledge in a certain subject area the participant brings to the study. This is a
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between-subject variable , and there are 2 levels of this independent variable. The first
level is the medical professional group participating in the experiment. This group is
composed of general practitioners, physician assistants, and nurse practitioners. The
second level is the non-medical professional group participating. This group is
comprised of people employed in another profession, which is not related to medicine or
health care.
The second independent variable is scene content. This is a within-subject
variable, and there are 2 levels of this variable. The first level consists of pictures of Xrays. These pictures are a familiar medium for the medical professionals. The second
level of this variable consists of pictures of everyday objects. This level is not any more
familiar to the medical professionals than it is to the non-medical professionals.
The first dependent variable is the reaction time. That is, the amount of time
needed for the participant to detect the change. This is measured in the exact number of
seconds. The second dependent variable is the accuracy of change detection. That is,
whether the change detected by the participant is the correct or incorrect answer. The
third dependent variable is the number of misses that occur. That is, the number of times
the participant exceeds the maximum amount of time allowed to detect the change.

Procedure
Participants were asked by the presenter to sign a consent form prior to the
experiment. Please refer to Appendix A. They were also asked to complete a
demographics form, and were given specific instructions for the experiment. Please refer
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to Appendix B, Appendix C, and Appendix D. All participants were given a near vision
test prior to beginning the experiment. They were asked to provide an email or mailing
address if they wish to obtain results of the experiment after the study is completed.
Participants were asked to sit down in front of a laptop computer. Pictures of
everyday scenes and X-rays were shown to all participants by alternating an original and
modified scene, separated by a brief blank screen, until the observer found the change.
While being timed, each participant was asked to give an immediate response by pressing
the left mouse button when he or she detected a change in the picture.
At that time, the participant was asked to verbally indicate what change he or she
detected. The presenter recorded whether the change indicated was correct or incorrect,
and then proceeded to the next picture. Participants were assured there would be no
medical problems to interpret or diagnoses to make. The participants were requested
only to report changes in the scene. Each participant was given a maximum allowance
of 60 seconds to detect a change. The presenter was seated beside the participant
approximately 2 feet away. The presenter recorded the results of the correct and incorrect
change-detection responses using pen and paper. The time it took to detect the change
was automatically recorded by the computer program as well as the number of misses.
Upon completing the experiment, the participants were debriefed on the study in which
they participated. See Appendix E.

Results
Parametric and non-parametric tests were used in computing results, comparing
medical professionals to non-medical professionals, and everyday scenes to X-rays.
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Three dependent variables were measured in this study. The reaction time
necessary to detect change, the number of times participants exceeded the 60 seconds
allowed to detect the change, and the number of incorrect responses were all calculated.
The data were screened for outliers. Any participant who exceeded 3 or more standard
deviations was removed from analysis. The data from one participant was removed from
the study as a result of this. The means and standard deviations for the performance data
are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Means and standard deviations for performance data.
Reaction Time

Medical

Nor>

Exceeded Time

Incorrect responses

Mean

St Dev

Mean

St Dev

Mean

St Dev

Scene

19.48072

3.326167

3.090909

1.640399

0.090909

0.301511

X-ray

14.94318

3.986396

0.818182

0.750757

0.090909

0.301511

Scene

20.33702

6.036776

2.416667

1.311372

025

0.621582

X-ray

16.26023

6.357478

175

1.864745

0.083333

0.288675

Medical

A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to
measure the effects of domain knowledge and scene content familiarity on the speed of
change detection. Effects reported as significant in this study met a criterion ofp <05.
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There was a significant main effect of scene content on reaction time (time from
image presentation to key press) F(l, 21) = 10.344, p = .004. An eta2 of .330 indicated
33% of variability in time needed to detect a change was attributed to scene content
familiarity. Observed power was .866. Overall, those viewing X-rays detected change
faster than those viewing everyday scenes, as seen in Table 1.
There was a non-significant main effect of domain knowledge on reaction time
(time from image presentation to key press), F( 1,21)= .417, p = .525. Observed
power was .095. Please refer to Figure 4.
There was also a non-significant interaction of domain knowledge with scene
content familiarity, F (1, 21) + .030,/? = .865. Observed power was .053.
25
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Figure 4. Number of seconds needed for medical and non-medical groups to detect
changes while viewing everyday scenes and X-rays.
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Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U and Wilcoxon Matched Pairs tests were
calculated to investigate the two accuracy measures of the number of times participants
exceeded the allotted time of sixty seconds to respond and the accuracy of detected
changes. The Mann-Whitney U-test was performed to compare differences between
medical versus non-medical professionals while the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs tests
compared differences between viewing X-rays and everyday scenes for both of the
accuracy measures.
Analyzing the results from time exceeding sixty seconds indicated that there was
a significant main effect between exceeded time viewing X-rays and exceeded time
viewing everyday scenes, T= -2.887, p = .004. More participants exceeded the sixty
seconds allotted for change detection while viewing everyday scenes. Please refer to
Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Number of trials exceeding 60 seconds viewing everyday scenes and X-rays.
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However, results showed there was no main effect between medical and nonmedical professionals for exceeded time in the viewing of X-rays, U = 50.500, p = .311,
or in the exceeded time in the viewing of everyday scenes, U = 50.500, p = .3. Please
refer to Figure 6 and Figure 7.
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Figure 6. The number of trials exceeding 60 seconds by medical and non-medical groups
viewing X-rays.
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Figure 7. The number trials exceeding 60 seconds by medical and non-medical groups
viewing everyday scenes.
Analysis of differences in accuracy of answer reports showed no significant
difference in viewing X-rays versus everyday scenes, 7=-.707, /?=.480 as well as no
differences between medical versus non-medical participants for the number of incorrect
responses when viewing X-rays, (7=65.5, p=.950, or everyday scenes, (7=60.550, p=.563.
Please refer to Figures 8, 9 and 10.
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Figure 8. Number of incorrect responses viewing everyday scenes and X-rays.
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viewing X-rays.
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Figure 10. Number of incorrect responses from medical and non-medical groups viewing
everyday scenes.

Discussion

Previous research findings are mixed regarding domain knowledge and scene
content familiarity. Most studies reviewed that involved domain knowledge resulted in
showing those with domain expertise in a subject area were quicker and more successful
in conducting searches compared to those without domain expertise (Allen, 1991;
Hoelscher & Strube, 1999; Hsich-Ye, 1993; Jansen et al., 1998; Lazonder et al., 2000;
Marchionini, 1995; Vakkari et al., 2003). The conceptual knowledge a user brings to the
search experience will affect decisions they make, such as which terms they will use in
conducting the search (Wildemuth, 2004).
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Based on the findings highlighted in the literature review, it was hypothesized that
those in the medical professionals group would detect change quicker and more
accurately than those in the non-medical professionals group, and that medical
professionals viewing X-rays would exhibit the quickest change detection overall.
In this study, however, results did not show an advantage for domain knowledge.
There was no significant difference between medical professionals and non-medical
professionals in the time needed to detect change. This result leads one to ask what the
difference was between this study and the domain knowledge studies performed in search
experience and search behavior.

The most significant difference was the nature of the

tasks (search vs.change detection). Conducting a search requires greater conceptual
knowledge and decision making, such as choosing a key word most effective in finding
the information you are seeking, or knowing when and how to advance your search.
Knowledge of the relevant subject area would be an advantage in choosing an effective
keyword, as pointed out by Wildemuth (2004). However, in performing the task of
change detection, one is initially drawing upon a quick physiological response. Retina
cells capture the images focused on to them by the cornea and lens, and electrical
impulses carry this information to the optic nerve, which in turn carries it to the brain via
a bundle of nerve fibers (Mayo Clinic Staff, 2007). Even though they are just points of
light with no real meaning at that point, meaningful objects are perceived. This
perception is thought to arise from an image segmentation process which groups those
retinal inputs that are likely to be part of the same object in the real world (Driver et al.,
2001). Results of a study conducted by Beck et al. (2001), using^MRI revealed enhanced
activity in the occipitotemporal cortex, ventral visual cortex, and right parietal cortex, all
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of which play a role in conscious change detection. These data suggest that activity in
these areas of the brain may be involved in determining what does and does not enter the
visual short term memory (VSTM) (Beck et al., 2006). When asked to depress a key the
moment you notice a change in a picture, you are not really drawing upon long term
memory or stored up knowledge. According to Rensink (2000), the perception of a
change requires a sequence of operations. First, information is loaded in VSTM, and
then held across the blank interval. The recently stored information is then compared to
the visible information in the new display, and if search needs to be continued, the VSTM
is unloaded, and attention is shifted to a new location. Change blindness could arise from
the failure of any of these operations (Rensink, 2000).
In this study, reaction time was measured in the number of seconds it took a
participant to depress the key, indicating detection of the change. Much of this detection
task requires more of a physiological response, which is a basic process for all people.
Whether we have gone to medical school, or run a business, or fly airplanes, our basic
responses to change detection occur the same way, using the same visual process and the
same parts of the brain. Acquired knowledge may be an advantage in making decisions
after the change has been detected. However, this study did not measure knowledge of
X-rays or medicine, but focused on ability to detect change, and whether the acquired
knowledge was indeed a significant factor. The results of this study suggest that this was
not the case.
Perhaps one reason there was a lack of interaction between the medical and nonmedical group was that changes in both sets of pictures, whether X-rays or scenes, were
simple changes. The experimenter avoided presenting changes in the X-rays that were
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diagnostic or medically pertinent. This way, changes in both sets of pictures were
uniform, thus avoiding a difference that would automatically confound the comparison of
everyday scenes versus X-rays. Removing the diagnostic aspects of the X-rays
essentially removed what made the medical experts different from the non-medical
professionals. Even though they did have domain knowledge, there is nothing inherent in
that knowledge that helped them beyond non-medical professionals when the diagnostic
elements were stripped away.
It was also expected that all participants would detect change quicker and more
accurately while viewing everyday scenes than viewing X-rays, as everyday scenes
would be more familiar to everyone regardless of profession. This hypothesis did not
hold true for this study as the results were not significant for the inaccurate responses and
the data were in the opposite direction from the hypothesis for the reaction time measure.
There was no significant difference in accuracy between the everyday scenes and X-rays,
whether a medical professional or non-medical professional. However, the reaction time
data indicated the opposite. Both groups of participants detected changes quicker in the
X-rays than in the everyday scenes. The fact that the changes in the X-rays were not
diagnostic would perhaps account for the lack of a significant difference in reaction time
of the medical group versus non-medical, but certainly does not account for the change
detection in X-rays being quicker than in everyday scenes across participants. There may
have been fewer distractions in the X-ray images, as the participant was not getting
sidetracked with new images in each picture. Having the same general subject matter in
every X-ray may have made for a quicker initial adjustment time than having to react to
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new objects every time. The content of the X-rays had less variability compared to
scenes.
As mentioned earlier, a study was conducted by Jones et al (2003) dealing with
attentional bias. This study, also using a flicker paradigm, demonstrated that drug users
detected changes in drug-related items more quickly and in neutral objects more slowly
than did non-users. A similar study by Yaxley & Zwann (2005), demonstrated similar
results when using groups of smokers vs. non-smokers. Change detection latencies were
shortest when a smoking -related object changed and longest when a smoking-related
object was present, but did not undergo change. These results show that attentional bias
can influence change detection. Knowledge and biases play an important role in
directing our attention toward or away from changing objects in scenes. Another
interesting result of the Yaxley & Zwann study showed that the non-smokers also showed
the same attentional bias as the smokers when they were made aware of the
experimenter's smoking focus, but they did not display any attentional bias when they
were unaware. This result is indicative of how situational awareness influences our
thinking and our responses. In the current study, as the participants became aware very
early on that X-rays were of importance, perhaps they also demonstrated the same
attentional bias as seen in the non-smokers group in the previous study. That may
account for the non-medical group as well as the medical group seeing changes quicker in
the X-rays than in the everyday scenes.
An interesting observation is that participants in both groups, except for those
exceeding 60 seconds which were excluded from the reaction time data, averaged about
10-30 seconds to see the change. Participants either saw it in half the time, or they didn't
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see it at all. This finding reflects that more time does not necessarily mean better
performance. In doing future research, it would be interesting to further probe this aspect
of time. Perhaps any changes to be detected or revealed, whether in an X-ray or
symptom, or a gauge or a business report occurs in the first 30 seconds of observation.
Also, allowing 60 seconds in trials to detect change may be excessive, and 30 seconds
would be a better time allotment.
There also did not appear to be a speed/accuracy trade-off where participants
responded quickly but inaccurately. Out of 576 trials, there were only 6 incorrect
answers, which can also account for the lack of difference in all comparisons for the
inaccurate responses.
In considering limitations, making the changes in the X-rays non-diagnostic was
the experimenter's cautious decision to reduce the amount of influence prior knowledge
would have on the study. This caution may have turned out to be a limitation in the
study. In trying to achieve tighter control, it may have resulted in not being able to tap
into that knowledge as much as originally planned.
Another possible limitation to the study was sample size. The number of subjects
in each group was kept to a smaller number (12) due to the difficulty in obtaining medical
professionals as participants. It may be possible that having a larger group, such as 25
might have altered the results of the study, although the power in the statistics of the
study was high which would suggest that adding more participants might not change the
outcome of this study.
Future research could be quite helpful in finding ways to improve change
detection. Although there are limits to some of the conclusions that can be drawn from
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using a change blindness paradigm, it is helpful in our understanding of the visual
process, and what factors can affect our ability to detect change. Results have shown that
focus of attention plays a key role in change detection. Future studies can help us better
understand situation awareness, as allocation of attention is a key component in this area.
Situation awareness is an important aspect to understand and consider in a wide variety of
disciplines, such as medicine and aviation. Future research can also be done to determine
if people detect change quicker or more often after participating in several trials or
regular exercises in change detection/change blindness. If this would be the case,
perhaps change detection is something that can be improved with training or in schooling
for various professions. Or, perhaps another similar study using more than two groups,
or different types of scenes might bring about some interesting results. In trying to
improve the current study, maybe using more medical objects in some of the scenes or
possibly creating more diagnostic changes in the X-rays might enhance the domain
knowledge aspect of the study. Findings through future studies such as this could result
in actually having an impact on reducing error.
In summary, although the results of this study were not as predicted, they were
quite revealing of not only the physiological process that occurs, but also the dynamics
involved in people trying to detect change, such as being more attentive to one area due
to a bias.
The basis of this study was medical error. In trying to find a solution for a
problem, such as finding a cure for a disease, one must first have a deep understanding of
the disease or the problem. Studying what causes the problem, why it is there, or what
makes it better or worse is of primary importance before being able to reduce or eliminate
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the problem. Looking at the ability to detect change and what affects that ability is a first
step in finding a solution to improve that aspect of human error. As mentioned in the
beginning of this report, according to Reason (1990) there are two types of human error.
One is a mistake, which is an error in judgment, and the other is a slip, which is an
unintentional error while trying to reach an objective. Although many medical errors are
a result of professional judgment, there are also many costly errors that are slips when
something has gone unnoticed. If a doctor misses something on a scan or an X-ray, it
may be very unsettling or even devastating. Conducting this study resulted in perhaps
looking at medical error in a different light. Medical errors caused by bad judgment
would be considered malpractice or just poor medicine. However, if an unfortunate
situation occurs medically because of a slip, or that the physician just didn't see a change
on a scan, perhaps this should not be considered a "medical" error, but merely a human
error. According to the results of this study, initial detection of a change might not hinge
on how much acquired knowledge you have, or to which professional group you belong.
Perhaps a slip should not point to medical malpractice, but more to basic human error. In
this case, what we often think of as medical errors may in fact have nothing to do with
medicine. When a doctor assesses the abnormality once it is detected or decides on an
intervention, then acquired knowledge is used. Studies such as this one help us to
understand more about the ability to detect change, not only in the realm of medical error,
but also human error in general, as this is necessary for bringing about solutions.
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Appendix A
The Effect of Domain Knowledge and Scene Content Familiarity on
Change Blindness Detection.
Consent for Participation in Human Factors Study

The study in which you are about to participate is an experiment examining
domain knowledge and scene familiarity in the viewing of pictures. This study is being
conducted by Marianne Baskin, graduate student at Embry Riddle Aeronautical
University. The experiment has been approved by the Institutional Review Board
Committee of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
In this experiment you will view some X-ray images and pictures, and will be
asked to respond to what you see in the images. All responses will be given by pressing a
key on the computer, or verbally indicating a response. Please be assured that this
experiment is in no way harmful to the participant, and that all X-ray images will be
fictitious—pertaining to no real person. No participants will be held responsible in any
way for any observations or comments made. All data will be reported in group form
only, and will be kept confidential. I will be happy to give you a copy of this informed
consent form. You are also welcome to a report of the results at the end of the study if
you desire. Please contact me at 386-316-8484 or by email at baskinm@erau.edu or you
can contact my advisor, Dr. Shawn Doherty at 386-226-6249 or by email at
dohertsh@erau.edu .
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Statement of Consent

I acknowledge that I have been informed of and understand the nature and purpose of this
study, and I freely consent to participate. I acknowledge that I am between 18 and 65
years of age.
Signed

Date

Experimenter

Date
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Appendix B
Demographics

Name

_

Age
Sex (circle one) M F
Profession (circle one)

Physician

PA-C

ARNP

How long have you been practicing?
Have you participated in a change blindness experiment in the past?
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Appendix C
Demographics

Name
Age
Sex (circle one) M

F

What is your profession?
Have you participated in a change blindness experiment in the past?

48
Appendix D
Instructions for Participants

Welcome and thank you for participating in our study! In this experiment, you
will be asked to look at 24 pictures, one at a time on a computer screen.

Each picture

will be flickering. You will be asked to let the operator know if and when you notice any
changes in the picture by immediately pressing down the left mouse button. At that time,
the operator will ask you to verbally identify the change you noticed. You will be given a
period of 60 seconds to view each picture, or until you notice the change. If you exceed
the 60 second period before noticing any change, you will simply move on to the next
picture. There will be only 1 change in each picture.
If you have any questions, please ask them at this time.
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Appendix E
Debriefing for All Participants

The experiment in which you have just participated is an attempt to investigate
the effect of domain knowledge and scene content familiarity on change detection.
In any profession, the risk of human error is always present. Whether it be a
minor risk or a major risk, such as those sometimes put forth in the fields of aeronautics
or medicine, we have never been able to eliminate that risk. Errors sometimes occur due
to simply missing something—like a minor change in a display gauge or perhaps an Xray or test result. Experiments such as this help us to understand what factors might be
involved in the detection of change, as minor as they may seem. It was expected that
participants with domain knowledge (medical professionals) would detect change quicker
than those with no domain knowledge (non-medical professionals), based on previous
findings related to participants' levels of expertise in the relevant field. It was also
expected that all participants viewing pictures would detect change quicker and more
accurately than those viewing X-rays, as everyday scenes are more familiar to everyone
than specialized images such as X-rays. Finally, it was expected that participants with
domain knowledge viewing X-rays would exhibit the quickest change detection overall.
This is consistent with previous findings that the search process is affected by one's
familiarity with the area or relative comfort with the scene content, as there are
significant differences between experts and novices in their search behavior.
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If you have any further questions, please ask or contact Marianne Baskin at
baskinm@erau.edu or Shawn Doherty at dohertsh@erau.edu. Thank you so much for
participating. I will be happy to send you the results of the experiment if you wish.

